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Abstract 
Within Europe, there is a clear diff erence in the strength of political activism between old and new 
member states. Taking Dalton’s diff erentiation between old and new types of participation, ‘duty’ and 
‘engaged’ citizenship, as a point of departure, the article explores the major predictors for the new, 
network-based and horizontal political practices among young people. The article uses data from the 
2006 and 2012 rounds of the European Social Survey to explore country and age group diff erences within 
the EU to seek out structural reasons for the trends in duty and engaged citizenship. The results show 
that duty citizenship is decreasing and engaged citizenship increasing, but the changes are small and 
not only among youth. Both types of political participation are related to strong evaluations of the 
performance of democracy. While there are signifi cant diff erences in value orientations between adult 
engaged and duty citizens, these diff erences are less marked in the case of young people.
Keywords: political participation, young people, duty citizenship, engaged citizenship, European 
Union.
Introduction
While participation in elections has been experiencing an accelerating decline in recent decades, it has 
been claimed that young people have become especially disaff ected and disengaged. Recent research 
on the political participation of the young generation shows a more nuanced picture. Young people 
are found to hold fi rm beliefs in the idea of democracy, but they are critical of the real functioning of 
representative democracy, which has also caused lower participation in its traditional forms. At the 
same time, we can see a rise in alternative forms of democratic participation, a change that Russell 
Dalton (2008) explains as a shift from ‘duty citizenship’ to ‘engaged citizenship’. This has raised the 
question of whether the traditional indicators used for studying political participation and attitudes 
are still able to capture the wider picture.
In the article, we use the data from the European Social Survey (ESS) to see if there is empirical 
proof of the aforementioned trends in Europe. ESS data has been used to study political participation 
before: in the context of social inequality (Gallego, 2008), institutional trust (Marien & Christensen, 
2013), diff erent political regimes (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2013), age groups (Quintelier, 2007), and ethnic 
and linguistic minorities (Sandovici & Listhaug, 2010). The specifi c focus of our analysis is the political 
participation of the young in relation to their attitudes towards democracy.
The study had two major aims: fi rst, we tried to trace the shift in political participation from 
the dominant model of duty citizenship to that of engaged citizenship among European youth in 
comparison to older generations and explored the main predictors for the two types of political 
participation. We also examined how political engagement diff ers between diff erent EU countries. 
*  E-mail address of the corresponding author: kulliki.seppel@ut.ee
Engaged and Critical? The Young Generation’s Political Participation in Eu Countries 53
Second, we tried to evaluate to what extent the adherence to alternative types of political engagement 
could be explained by the perception of the functioning of political institutions or by more personal 
indicators.
We analysed data from ESS surveys conducted in 2006 and 2012. We compared the responses about 
political and civic participation of young people (15-24) and adults to questions related to estimations 
of the functioning of democracy in their own countries and to personal values. 
Theoretical background
Recent literature on the political participation of the young generation has focused on two key issues. 
First, it has been claimed that a contradiction exists between young people’s belief in democratic 
values and the whole conception of democracy, on the one hand, and their own low actual practice of 
representative democracy, paired with critical assessments of relevant possibilities, on the other (the 
‘democratic paradox’) (Cammaerts, Bruter, Banaji, Harrison, & Anstead, 2014; Norris, 2002; Rossi, 2009; 
Sloam, 2013). Second, recent decades have witnessed a decline in the traditional forms of democratic 
participation (duty citizenship) and a rise in the involvement in non-electoral, temporary, network-
based, partly intertwined forms of political and civic activity (engaged citizenship) (Dalton, 2008).
Democratic paradox
It has been claimed that the distancing of political agenda from young people’s practical life experience 
has increased their criticism of and withdrawal from traditional political participation (Niemi & 
Klingler, 2012; Henn, Weinstein, & Forrest, 2005). Qualitative studies have indicated that young people 
in Europe in general see democracy as a fair and healthy principle for organising society (as opposed 
to authoritarian forms of governance), and generally favour the traditional conception of democracy 
centred on the founding role of elections and the will of the people (Cammaerts et al., 2014). But 
young people “tend to be more radical, less diplomatic and very interested in ensuring that how things 
are done is explicitly detailed and in accordance with their interests and/or principles” (Rossi, 2009, 
p. 491). They express the contradiction between the ideal and real life by outlining the limitations, 
impossibility, fragility, rarity and contradictions involved in actual practice, e.g. the rare use of the 
referendum as a form of direct democracy and the few opportunities to participate in political decision 
making (Cammaerts et al., 2014; Bruter & Harrison, 2009). At the same time, their own immediate 
experience of participation (in schools and in their families) is often ignored or is not relevant. The 
contradiction between critical attitudes and high ideals is called the ‘democratic paradox’ (Pattie, 
Seyd, & Whiteley, 2004). On the basis of high ideals, there is an increase in disillusionment in ‘real 
politics’ (Norris, 1999; Torcal & Montero, 2006), which leads young people to search for new forms of 
participation and self-expression. Thus, the contradictory approach of youth towards representative 
democracy does not indicate the young generation’s disinterest in politics as a whole, but rather in 
its classical institutional organisations and political establishments, and it shows their preference for 
other ways of being politically engaged (Norris, 2002; Rossi, 2009; Sloam, 2013; Cammaerts et al., 2014). 
Traditional and new forms of democratic participation
Young people have become less interested in participating in the system of representative democracy 
and tend to prefer non-electoral forms of political engagement, such as participation in demonstrations, 
signing petitions, consumer boycotts and joining political online forums (Dalton, 2008, 2009; Norris, 
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2002; McCaff rie & MaMarchrsh, 2013; Martin, 2012; Wicks, LeBlanc, Wicks, Maxwell, & Schulte, 2014). 
Their political activity has changed in form: from long-term ideological allegiances through such 
well-established organisations as parties and trade unions, to new forms of political engagement 
based on ‘personally meaningful causes’, which are much less stable, have horizontal structures and 
off er fl exible forms of involvement (Rossi, 2009; Martin, 2012; Sloam, 2013). New types of political 
actions include attempts to infl uence the behaviour of multinational corporations and international 
organisations, blurring the line between ‘political’ and ‘social’ action (Norris, 2002, pp. 192-193 see 
McCaff rie & March 2013, p. 115).
Russell Dalton has suggested a shift in the whole idea of political citizenship: the earlier model of 
‘duty citizens’ is being replaced by the idea of ‘engaged citizens’. While duty citizens regard citizen-
ship as a duty-based norm, involving participation in elections, traditional forms of allegiance and 
generally abiding by the rules of social order, the idea of engaged citizenship sees citizenship as 
primarily involving engagement in society expressed via solidaristic support for the worse-off , political 
independence and activity both politically and in civil society (Dalton, 2008, pp. 80-84).
Gaiser and Rijke (2010, p. 38) have similarly distinguished three types of civic and political 
engage ment:
a) long-term participation in (large) instrumental interest organisations, 
b) involvement in informal groups, self-supporting networks and citizen initiatives that have been 
labelled ‘new social movements’ since the 1970s, and 
c) temporary and concrete political actions, which serve the purpose of supporting or articulating 
political goals.
Participation in traditional and ‘new social movement’ types of organisations has become rather 
formalised, the free spirit of NGOs is increasingly being replaced by technocratism and formalism, 
and NGOs have become bureaucratised and practise neo-liberal management styles, which has led 
to the compartmentalisation and reproduction of the political establishment instead of opposition 
(Cumming, 2008; Choudry & Shragge, 2011; Kohler-Koch & Quittkat, 2013).
Gaiser and Rijke’s third type, which echoes Dalton’s idea of engaged citizenship, seems to be 
especially attractive to young people (Juris & Pleyers, 2009). This includes less formal, temporary and 
horizontally (self-) organised forms of civic and political participation, which serve the purpose of 
supporting or articulating political goals. These movements, which have found contextualisation in 
scientifi c literature, such as the Occupy movement and ‘Indignados’ in Spain, diff er from ‘social move-
ments’ (e.g. women’s rights or environmental movements of the 1960s) in that they are considered 
expressions of disappointment with the political system and social order in general (Sloam, 2013). 
Seemingly sudden outbursts are deeply rooted in the long-term unanswered needs of young people (Ó 
Beacháin & Polese, 2010). These protest movements have little rational and functional basis from the 
point of view of political integration.
Young people associate traditional political involvement with the top-down type of communication 
that assumes the target group to be passive information seekers whose main possibility of shaping 
political processes is to be knowledgeable about candidates and make rational decisions (Wicks et al., 
2014, p. 627). The more participatory forms of political communication via social media networks are 
less acknowledged as political activism (op cit), and are hence also less studied in traditional surveys of 
political activism. However, Internet-mediated civic and political engagement characterises the young 
generation and also shapes the general political culture. Intensive use of social networks moves young 
people towards political engagement (e.g. Bode, 2012; Conroy, Feezell, & Guerrero, 2012; Gil de Zúñiga, 
Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012). The manner in which young people interact in social networks signifi cantly 
contributes to the construction of their own, independent political identities. Rainie and Wellman 
(2012) have proposed a model of ‘networked individualism’, which accommodates individual values, 
political attitudes (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991; Inglehart, 1990) and self-actualisation (Bennett, Wells 
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and Rank, 2009) with the communication patterns of online media. Networking young citizens are 
less likely to be members of such traditional political organisations as parties or trade unions, instead 
participating in non-hierarchical and project initiatives and refl exively engaging in the lifestyle politics 
(Bang, 2004; Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011) characteristic to the model of engaged citizenship.
The change in the form of political participation, however, can lead to an increase in the 
polarisation of young citizens and marginalisation along the lines of both political and civic 
participation (Dalton, Scarrow, & Cain, 2004; Sloam, 2013; Martin, 2012). Political participation also 
correlates strongly with education and household income in its traditional form (Verba, 2004). But 
while ‘duty citizenship’ supports wide-scale social participation, the ‘engaged citizen’ type requires 
stronger political independence and more resource demanding habits of political engagement. This 
can result in less educated and socio-economically less well-off  people dropping out of democratic 
practices altogether. However, there are contradictory opinions: Gallego’s (2008, p. 22) analysis of ESS 
2004 data on various types of political participation showed that while higher social and educational 
status had an impact on voting, working for a party and boycotting certain products, its impact 
was less evident in participating in demonstrations (a key feature of engaged citizenship). Thus, the 
evidence for the growing polarising eff ect of engaged citizenship is contradictory and needs further 
exploration. 
It is not completely clear whether young people’s propensity for new types of engagement is 
age-related (i.e. whether they will turn back to traditional forms of political participation as they get 
older), or whether we are witnessing an irreversible transformation of political culture in the late 
modern, individualised risk society (Rossi, 2009; Beck, 1992). Quintelier (2007) claims that although 
life-cycle eff ects account for many of the diff erences in voter turnout, they can only explain minor 
diff erences in broader political participation: younger people are not less active, but just have 
diff erent practices. Belonging to an ethnic minority group is also a controversial predictor of political 
participation (Gallego, 2008; Sandovici & Listhaug, 2010). Ethnic minorities may face the risk of political 
marginalisation because of their low levels of political interest and the majority’s cultural supremacy, 
but this can also serve as a potential for political mobilisation.
Starting from these theoretical premises, we constructed two indices of political participation 
(duty and engaged citizenship) and we looked for the major factors that contributed to belonging to 
either type among the young and adult populations.
Methodology
Sample
For the empirical inquiry, we used the European Social Survey data from the 2006 and 2012 rounds 
(European ..., 2006; European …, 2012), whose survey questions best matched our research interests. 
The main advantage of ESS is the possibility of comparing the patterns of development of diff erent 
European countries. ESS data make it possible to analyse diff erent social processes, institutional 
developments and relations between people’s attitudes and behaviour. As the intention of the ESS is 
to guarantee interstate comparison and high quality of data, all survey procedures are standardised 
for the participating countries. 
For the analysis of 2012 data, all 21 participating European Union countries were included in 
the sample. For the comparison between 2006 and 2012, only those 18 countries were used that 
participated in both rounds: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom (total sample 32,602).
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Indices
Based on the theoretical premises, we created three original indices: two for political participation 
(engaged and duty citizens) and one for the performance of democracy. 
Indices of engaged and duty-oriented citizenship. The composition of the relevant index variables 
measured individuals’ relations with political parties and other forms of social mobilisation that 
have political outputs. The index variable ‘duty citizenship’ was composed of variables that describe 
personal affi  liation with the political public sphere, as well as participation in the legitimation of 
political power and practice. Due to the age limits on voting, we didn’t use the most typical indicator 
— participation in voting — in the composition. To compose the index, we fi rst created binary variables 
to match the scales (1—yes, 0—all other values). The variables used are the following: How interested 
would you say you are in politics? (1—very/quite interested, 0—other); Have you worked in a political party 
or action group? (1—yes, 0—other); Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other 
parties? (1—yes, 0—other).
The index variable ‘engaged citizenship’ was composed of four single variables that included 
questions about taking part in voluntary organisations, as well as questions about more fl exible forms 
of social mobilisation. Similarly, for all variables used, binary scales were created. The variables that 
formed the index were the following: In the past 12 months, how often did you get involved in work for 
voluntary or charitable organisations? (1—at least once a week/once a month/once every three months/
once every six months, 0—other); Have you boycotted certain products? (1—yes, 0—other); Have you taken 
part in a lawful public demonstration in the last 12 months? (1—yes, 0—other); Have you signed a petition in 
the last 12 months? (1—yes, 0—other). Since both citizen indices are self-constructed, we used principal 
component analysis in order to assess the compatibility of the constituent variables. We also carried 
out a reliability analysis by using Cronbach alpha and Guttmann lambda, but due to the small number 
of variables used and the nature of the scales (binary), the results were only fair (for both indices, the 
value of alpha was between 0.42-0.50).
According to the frequency of each constructed index, the values ‘absent’, ‘low’ and ‘high’ were 
determined. The value ‘absent’ indicates absent values of initial index, 1—low and 2-4—high values. In 
the data analysis, individuals who scored ‘high’ on the index were defi ned as belonging to the group 
of duty and engaged citizens, respectively.
Index of the perceived performance of democratic principles. The index ‘performance of 
democracy’ measures how people rated the functioning of the diff erent principles of democracy in 
their home countries. The variables used to assess the performance of democracy were diff erent 
elements of the question: To what extent do you think each of the following statements applies in [country] 
(0—does not apply at all, 1—applies completely):
– that national elections are free and fair; 
– that opposition parties are free to criticise the government; 
– that the media are free to criticise the government; 
– that governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job; 
– that the rights of minority groups are protected; 
– that the courts are able to stop the government from acting beyond its authority. 
In order to make sure of the reliability of the index ‘performance of democracy’, a reliability 
analysis using Cronbach alpha was carried out. The value of Cronbach alpha was 0.82, and this was 
suffi  cient to consider the index reliable. The ‘Importance of democracy’ index (which is used in the 
second regression) is constructed from the same six elements of the question How important do you 
think it is for democracy in general? (0—not at all important, 10—Extremely important for democracy).
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Figure 1: Types of political engagement among the youth and total sample in 2006 and 2012
Source: authors’ illustration based on ESS 2012 data
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To investigate the characteristics of duty and engaged citizens, multinomial logistic regression 
was used. High index values were used as dependent variables and compared to absent and low 
index values. Socio-demographic variables and self-positioning on the social scale were independent 
variables in the models political participation. For the democratic attitudes, values of diff erent 
agency-related variables were defi ned as independent. To assess the goodness of fi t of a model, the log 
likelihood function (–2LL) was used. 
Results
Characteristics of duty and engaged citizens
To study the typical characteristics of duty and engaged citizens, we ran a regression analysis on a cross-
section of socio-demographic variables (see Table 1). The analysis revealed mostly expected outcomes: 
the likelihood of a male respondent being a duty citizen was much higher than that of a female 
respondent, although a bit lower for a young male respondent. Compared to the representatives of the 
65+ generation, the younger age group was fi ve times less likely to belong to the duty citizen group, 
but there was no signifi cant diff erence between the 25-64 and younger age groups. The likelihood of 
belonging to the engaged type of political participation does not diff er between men and women or 
between the age groups 15-24 and 25-64.
Education and social position predicted the likelihood of being both a duty and an engaged citizen 
in similar ways: higher index values increased the likelihood of being politically engaged. Diff erences 
in education and perceived social position were less diff erentiating in the case of the youngest age 
cohort, whereas the likelihood of being a duty citizen was more diff erentiating than being an engaged 
citizen. People belonging to ethnic minority groups were more likely to be duty citizens and less likely 
to be engaged citizens. Among people aged 15-24, belonging to a duty-citizen group was even more 
likely among minority groups than among the total sample.
Between 2006 and 2012 changes in political participation were not signifi cant. The proportion of 
people with ‘absent’ values on the duty citizenship index and ‘average/high’ values on the engaged 
citizenship index increased slightly. The share of people with average/high scores on the engaged 
citizenship index increased more among the younger group than among the 25+ age group.
Nearly 60% of the older age group had absent or low index values on both indices (Figure 1); among 
the young, the share was yet 12 percentage points higher. The share of people with average and high 
values on both indices was relatively low. The share of engaged citizens (included those who were also 
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duty citizens) was quite similar among both age groups and did not change over the period. The main 
diff erence between age groups was the share of ‘pure’ duty citizens, i.e. people who scored high only 
on the duty citizenship index, which decreased a bit and was much higher among older age groups.
Duty and engaged citizenship in diff erent European Union countries
Younger people are always less interested in political participation than older ones. The most signifi cant 
diff erences in the scores on the duty citizenship index between young and older generations seemed 
to be in old democratic countries, such as France, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden (Figure 2). 
The diff erences between age groups were less noticeable in Southern European countries, such as 
Spain, Portugal and Italy. Diff erences in engaged citizenship did not form a clear pattern, and bigger 
diff erences between age groups in engaged citizenship occurred in old democracies: Sweden, France 
and the UK. It is surprising that only in two countries — Ireland and Poland — the older age group had 
considerably lower scores (5% and more) in engaged citizenship than the younger group.
Figure 2: Share of duty and engaged citizens among the young and the older age group in 2012 (capital 
letters — older age group, small letters — younger age group)
Source: authors’ compilation based on ESS 2012 data
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The shares of young duty citizens and young engaged citizens diff ered signifi cantly between 
European states (Figure 2). The countries where the share of young people with higher duty citizenship 
scores was higher tended to be culturally similar: mainly the Germanic, Benelux and Nordic countries: 
Denmark (40%), Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland and Germany (26-30%). At the other pole are several 
new EU member states: the Czech Republic (1%), Lithuania (2%), Hungary (6%), Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia (7-9%).
The pattern of the countries with higher shares of ‘engaged’ youth is not that distinguishing. In this 
type of youth engagement, both Southern European countries and the Nordic countries scored higher. 
Here we fi nd Germany (33%), Spain (32%), Italy, Ireland and Finland (24%-25%). At the opposite pole 
are the countries with very low numbers of young people with high levels of engagement: Lithuania 
(1%), Hungary (3%), Slovenia (4%) and Bulgaria (5%). However, many of these and other new member 
states showed growth in engaged citizenship among young people from 2006 to 2012, while shifts in 
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Western countries were more variable (Figure 3). For example, the number of young people who had 
high scores on the engaged citizen index decreased in France by 14 percentage points, in Denmark by 
10, and in Finland by 6 percentage points. Still, there were no countries where young people scored 
remarkably lower on both indices compared to 2006.
Political engagement, disappointment in democracy and agency
Although there was no signifi cant change in duty and engaged citizenship in the total sample, there 
were changes at the country level. The diff erences among young people between 2006 and 2012 had 
shifted more in the index of engaged citizenship (Figure 3) than in the index of duty citizenship, 
especially within older European countries. The diff erences between older and younger age groups 
were greater in the duty citizenship index (Figure 2). To explain this tendency, we set out to test how 
much these diff erences between diff erent forms of political participation could be predicted by the 
respondents’ disappointment in the performance of politicians and how much by personal beliefs 
about individual agency.
Democratic performance. When we compared the evaluations given by people on the performance 
of democracy, we saw that both age and adherence to either type of political participation played a 
role. In EU, the average score of the index ‘performance of democracy’ was 7.24 among adult duty 
citizens, 6.84 among adult engaged citizens, 6.72 among young duty citizens and 6.61 among young 
engaged citizens. All over the European Union young people were more critical of the performance 
of democracy in their own countries than were adults, with the exception of Estonia and the Czech 
Republic. At the same time, those with high scores on the engaged citizenship index were more 
critical than those characterised by more traditional forms of political participation; the diff erence 
was greater in the adult group. The evaluation of democracy was higher in ‘old Europe’, especially 
in the countries that tend to emerge at the top of diff erent ‘objective’ democracy tables: the Nordic 
countries, the Netherlands and Germany. The Nordic countries stood out as having the largest gap 
between young people and adults, with the young generation being much more critical in their 
evaluation of the performance of democracy. The countries with lower scores were mostly Eastern 
Figure 3: Change in shares of duty and engaged citizenship among the youth population in 2006-2012,
by countries
Source: authors’ compilation based on ESS 2006 and 2012 data
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European countries and Southern European countries recently hit by severe economic crises (Italy, 
Spain and Portugal).
While among the adult population the duty citizens had systematically higher evaluations of 
democratic performance than engaged citizens, among the young satisfaction with the performance 
of democracy was a less reliable predictor of the type of political engagement. Especially in Eastern 
Europe, ‘engaged’ youngsters tended to evaluate democratic performance more highly than did their 
peers with more traditional forms of political engagement.
Personal values
We also compared both age groups and types of political participation in terms of what they considered 
important in life and society (Figure 4).
The data showed that the diff erences between the two types of political engagement were the 
greatest on the questions related to following rules and adherence to safety and security, where the 
duty citizens scored signifi cantly higher than the engaged citizens did. Also, being recognised for 
success was more important to duty citizens in both age groups. At the same time, engaged citizens 
scored higher on values that emphasise free-mindedness (adventures, exciting life and creativity). 
Interestingly, among the young equality was valued much more highly by the engaged than by 
the duty citizens, while among the adults the diff erence was small. On questions of independence 
(making one’s own decisions) and caring for others, which are considered typical characteristics of 
engaged citizenship (Dalton, 2008, pp. 80-84), the diff erences were very small and these seemed to 
indicate rather general social activity (as scores for the politically not-engaged were much lower for 
this variable).
Comparing the young generation and adults, predictably young people valued excitement and 
pleasure, along with independence and creativity, more highly while being more sceptical of rules 
and obligations. Young people’s drive for success and recognition was also considerably higher than 
among adults. While scoring at the same level as adults on caring for other people, youngsters showed 
less regard for the natural environment, which is also well-known in the research on environmental 
attitudes (Eurobarometer …, 2008; Kalmus, Keller, & Kiisel, 2009). To compare the relative importance 
of democratic attitudes and personal values in predicting the type of political engagement, we ran a 
regression analysis on the young and adult duty and engaged citizens (Table 2).
Table 1: Political participation (high index value compared to absent and low, 21 EU member states in 
2012, logistic regression)
Age 15-24 Age 25+ Total sample
Duty 
citizen
Engaged 
citizen
Duty 
citizen
Engaged 
citizen
Duty 
citizen
Engaged 
citizen
Male (ref: female) 1.6*** 1.0 2.1*** 1.0 2.0*** 1,0
Aged 15 to 24 (ref: 65+) 0.2*** 1.4***
Aged 25 to 64 (ref: 65+) 0.4*** 1.4***
Primary education or less (ref: tertiary) 0.3*** 0.6*** 0.2*** 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.3***
Secondary education (ref: tertiary) 0.6*** 0.9 0.4*** 0.5*** 0.4*** 0,5***
Social position low (ref: high) 0.5*** 0.6** 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.3***
Social position medium (ref: high) 0.8* 1.1 0.6*** 0.6*** 0.6*** 0.6***
Belonging to a minority group (ref: not) 1.4* 0.9 1.0 0.5*** 1,1 0.5***
-2LL 277.7 279.9 887.2 840.5 1200.2 1185.0
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Source: authors’ compilation based on ESS 2012 data
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The analysis showed that the link between the evaluations of democracy and either type of 
citizenship was strong: those who rated the need to follow democratic principles by political 
institutions more highly and those who rated the actual functioning of those principles more highly 
were more likely to be politically involved. People who considered democratic principles to be very 
relevant were three times more likely to be duty and engaged citizens than were those who considered 
these not important at all or weakly important. Similarly, people who evaluated the performance of 
democratic principles most highly were twice as likely to be duty citizens than those who evaluated 
the performance of democracy at the medium level (the ability of the performance of the democracy 
index to predict engaged citizenship was a bit lower). It is noteworthy that the rather abstract 
question about the importance of the democratic functioning of political institutions had a higher 
likelihood of predicting belonging to the politically active groups than more contextualised questions 
about how they actually performed. At the same time, there was no diff erentiation between the two 
participation types. Among both adults and youngsters, people who scored higher on the importance 
of democracy index were more likely to be politically active, either as duty or engaged citizens. People 
with stronger opinions about democratic performance (who scored high or low on the index) were 
more likely to be engaged and duty citizens, compared to those in between (with average index 
values). This raises the question of whether the diff erences in political action were actually tied to 
acknowledged dissatisfaction with politics. However, those who rated the performance of democracy 
most critically were 50% more likely to be both duty and engaged citizens than those with medium 
ratings. Therefore, political action was defi ned by both strong criticism and strong trust.
Figure 4: The evaluation of what was considered important by the respondents among young and 
older age groups 2012. Answer to the question: Now I will briefl y describe some people. Please listen to 
each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you (1—not like me at all, 6—very much 
like me)
Source: authors’ illustration based on ESS 2012 data
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Important to seek adventures
and have an exciting life
Important to do what
is told and follow rules
Important to be successful and that
people recognize achievements
Important to seek fun
and things that give pleasure
Important to live in secure
and safe surroundings
Important to think
new ideas and be creative
Important to care for
nature and environment
Important to help people and
care for others well-being
Important to make own
decisions and be free
Important that people are treated
equally and have equal opportunities
Duty 25+
Engaged 25+
Duty 15-24
Engaged 15-24
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As the perceived dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy (‘disillusionment’) didn’t 
explain why the young were politically less active, we looked for explanations at a more individual 
level. To estimate the likelihood of the characteristics of personal values predicting an individual’s 
political orientation, we asked questions about what kind of person the respondent thought he 
resembled.
Among the estimations of what kind of people they were, the best predictor of being politically 
active was the rating of personal safety: politically active people were less concerned with safety and 
more risk-prone, especially in the case of engaged citizens and older age groups. Those people who 
did not like to follow rules were at least twice more likely to be engaged citizens; there was not much 
diff erence between duty citizens and age groups in terms of the evaluation of rule following.
Considering making one’s own decisions important somewhat diff erentiated political activists from 
their less active counterparts, but there was not much diff erence between age groups or citizen types. 
The engaged groups were much more diff erentiated by ‘thinking of new ideas and being creative’ than 
the duty groups were, whereas in both citizen types the diff erentiation was higher in older age groups 
(those who valued creativity were more likely to be politically active). Those young people who rated 
success highly were twice as likely to be duty citizens as those who did not rate it highly, whereas 
older people who rated success highly were 40% less likely to be engaged citizens than those who did 
not. Adherence to duty citizenship could be predicted by the need to become successful among young 
people, by less emphasis on safe surroundings (especially among the older age group), by high ratings 
of creativity (among the older age groups) and by strong negative evaluations of the functioning of 
political institutions. Adherence to engaged citizenship could be predicted by lower evaluations of rule 
following, success (among the older age group) and safe surroundings (especially among the older 
Table 2: Political participation and democratic attitudes and values in diff erent age groups in 2012, 
(logistic regression analysis for the indices ‘high’)
Age 15-24 Age 25+
Duty 
citizen
Engaged 
citizen
Duty 
citizen
Engaged 
citizen
Importance of democracy low* (ref: high) 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.37***
Importance of democracy average (ref. high) 0.67*** 0.66*** 0.55*** 0.56***
Performance of democracy low (ref. high) 0.68*** 0.91 0.62*** 0.84***
Performance of democracy average (ref. high) 0.39*** 0.68*** 0.40*** 0.63***
Important to make own decisions: low (ref. high) 0.69 0.90 0.79*** 0.79***
Important to make own decisions: average (ref. high) 0.86 0.67*** 0.74*** 0.77***
Important to think of new ideas: low (ref. high) 0.92 0.50*** 0.62*** 0.28***
Important to think of new ideas: average (ref. high) 0.81** 0.70*** 0.83*** 0.57***
Important to live in safe surroundings: low (ref. high) 1.80*** 1.64*** 2.25*** 3.04
Important to live in safe surroundings: average (ref. high) 1.59*** 1.51*** 1.50*** 1.76***
Important to be successful: low (ref. high) 0.55*** 0.85 1.07 1.61***
Important to be successful: average (ref. high) 0.91 1.06 1.12*** 1.21***
Important to follow rules: low (ref. high) 1.14 1.75*** 0.98 1.67***
Important to follow rules: average (ref. high) 0.95 1.16 0.84*** 1.12***
-2LL 2524.59 2524.56 8047.81 7522.97
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
*Respondents were divided into three groups according to the scores on the ‘importance of democracy’ and 
‘performance of democracy’: high (8-10), average (4-7) and low (0-3)
Source: authors’ compilation based on ESS 2012 data
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group) and higher evaluations of creativity and new ideas (especially among the older age group). 
It can be assumed that young people who perceived themselves as successful had other routes and 
ways of realising success than worrying about collective issues. They probably used more individual 
strategies and were more self-centred than an average youth. Engaged citizens (especially the young) 
tended to be less respectful of rules. However, it is not clear how much they defi ed rules in real life (in 
both age groups). In general, the likelihood of a young person being either a duty or engaged citizen 
was less predicted by personal values than was the likelihood of the older age group (except in the 
valuing of success by duty citizens and slightly lower valuing of rules by engaged citizens).
Discussion and conclusion
The study set out to pursue two aims: to empirically trace the shift from duty citizens to engaged 
citizens in Europe and to characterise the diff erent types of political engagement. In addition, we 
attempted to determine to what extent these tendencies are related to the critical perception of 
democratic performance. The depth of the analysis was limited by the availability of relevant data, but 
the analysis allows us to conclude that while youngsters diff er from adults in their political activity, 
this is not due to an increase in engaged citizens (Dalton’s fi nding) but rather to a lower level of 
traditional political activism. Although in the total sample traditional political participation indeed 
slightly decreased and civic activism slightly increased, these changes were not age-group-specifi c and 
did not vary among diff erent countries.
Within Europe, there is a clear diff erence in the strength of activism between old and new member 
states, with ‘old Europeans’ (the Nordic countries, the Benelux countries and Germany) scoring higher 
on both duty and engaged citizenship scales. Young people in ‘old’ Europe evaluated the performance 
of democracy in their countries more highly than did their peers in Eastern or Southern Europe. 
Between 2006 and 2012, the changes in political participation among the young people in Eastern 
Europe were more similar than in the older EU countries. In Eastern Europe, there was a moderate 
increase in engaged citizenship and a decrease in duty citizenship. In Western and Southern Europe, 
the changes were much more variable and had higher amplitudes. Similarly to Gallego’s results, our 
data showed that the impact of education and social status (as well as gender and ethnic group) play 
a smaller role in the new type of political participation than in the traditional type. This casts doubt on 
the hypothesis of Dalton et al. (2004) that the new type of political activism has increased inequality 
in participation. On the contrary, it may actually have had a democratising eff ect.
In looking at the evaluations characterising the young and adult age groups and their political 
participation, we concluded that among the young the diff erences between engaged and duty citizens 
were less marked than among the adult population. While among the adult population engaged 
citizens were more critical of democratic performance than were duty citizens, among the young, 
who were in general more critical of the performance of democracy, it was a less reliable predictor 
of the type of political engagement. Especially in Eastern Europe, young engaged citizens tended to 
have more positive attitudes towards the performance of democracy in their own countries. Our 
data supported Dalton’s claim that duty citizens are more rule-abiding, while there was no diff erence 
between the activism types in other traits he linked with engaged citizenship: solidarity with and 
caring for others, and independent-mindedness. Both of these traits seem to characterise politically 
and socially active people more generally. In terms of values, engaged citizens were characterised 
more by self-expressive values, such as creativity and the search for excitement, while duty-citizens 
scored higher on the need for success and recognition.
Although young engaged citizens were more critical of the democratic performance of their 
countries, disillusionment with politics did not necessarily lead to a rise in political participation. 
Political participation is related to both strong optimism and strong criticism, and this tendency was 
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a bit less diff erentiating among the young than among the adult group. The changes within countries 
were variable and critical evaluations of the performance of democracy do not explain these shifts in 
one direction or another.
The period of six years may not be enough to capture signifi cant change, and the validity of the 
inquiry would be strengthened by looking at a longer time period or focussing on a less varied sample. 
To understand social change, questions need to focus more on activities and less on what respondents 
say. Our article focused on the two types of political participation; however, we did not focus much on 
the largest group: those who scored ‘absent’ on both scales. These people may have other practices 
that can be considered political, but are so far undefi ned in mainstream research in terms of political 
participation.
Based on this analysis, we suggest changing the questions in the European Social Survey in order 
to bring out respondents’ agency (social activism, social relations, consumer conduct, experiences 
in decision-making, participation in continuing education, etc.) and thus capture the ‘capitals’ 
respondents possess to invest in political participation. The lower participation of young people in 
political action may be explained by the organically lower density of social relations that support 
active agency and a higher need to focus on personal success (plurality of choices, social expectations, 
and building up individual identity).
Disappointment in politics has various faces, and these need to be defi ned as well. For example, 
someone may appear to be a youngster from a minority group, whose ability to participate in politics 
is lower, but the likelihood of that person experiencing injustice is usually higher than of a person 
from a majority group. This may also be a civic activist, whose ability to notice injustice or unsolved 
social problems is sharpened by networking and social interaction.
In conclusion, the eff ects of these changes on political participation can be signifi cant. It is possible 
that the new type of engagement may gradually overtake the meaning of ‘political’, although these 
new practices are not recognised as political by politicians. This raises the need for political parties to 
reposition their sources of legitimation, as well as their channels for information and dialogue. The 
fi ndings show that there is also a need for researchers to take a fresh look at the ‘political’ in peoples’ 
lives if they wish to include the practices of young people that are actually meaningful to them.
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